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Recent Cases
DIVORCE-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A RESIDENCY
REQUIREMENT IN A STATE DIVORCE LAW
Wymelenberg v. Syman, 328 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
In Wymelenberg v. Syman,1 a three judge federal court 2 held
that a provision of the Wisconsin Family Code8 governing divorce
actions which required that before an action for divorce could be
commenced, one of the parties must have been a bona fide resident
of Wisconsin for at least two years was unconstitutional in that it
violated the guarantees of equal protection and due process of
the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. 4
Plaintiff in the present case commenced an action for divorce
on May 22, 1970.5 As required by the provisions of the Wisconsin
1. 328 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
2. Jurisdiction was vested in the federal courts by 28 U.S.C. § 1343
(1962), 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1959) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). Pursuant to the
requirements of 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284 (1965), this case was heard by a
three judge panel.
3. See generally WIs. STAT. § 245.001 (Supp. 1971) et seq. The spe-
cific provision with which the court in Wymelenberg was faced (WIs. STAT.
§ 247.05(3) (Supp. 1971) ) provides:
Actions by or against residents for divorce. Regardless of where
the cause of action arose, an action for divorce by or against a per-
son who has been a bona fide resident of this state for at least two
years next preceding the commencement of the action shall be com-
menced in the county of this state in which at least one of the par-
ties has been a bona fide resident for not less than 30 days next
preceding the commencement of the action.
[hereinafter cited as residency requirement]. The court in Wymelenberg
did not strike down the 30 day provision of this statute. See note 98 and
accompanying text infra.
4. Wymelenberg v. Syman, 328 F. Supp. 1353, 1354 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
5. Id. at 1354.
Family Code6 covering divorce,7 the Family Court Commissioner for
Milwaukee County reviewed plaintiff's complaint and determined
that neither the plaintiff nor his wife had satisfied Wisconsin's two
year residency requirement." The Commissioner notified the Cir-
cuit Judge of this fact and the plaintiff's divorce action was dis-
missed.'
Following dismissal of his divorce action plaintiff brought this
action in federal court1 0 against the Family Court Commissioner
as
[a] member of a class composed of bona fide residents of
Wisconsin who meet all standards of eligibility for com-
mencing a divorce action except that they have not been
residents of the State of Wisconsin for at least two years
prior to the commencement of an action to seek a divorce."
The plaintiff sought to have the Wisconsin residency requirement
declared invalid as a violation of due process and equal protection.
The decision by the court in Wymelenberg that a residency re-
quirement in a state divorce statute is unconstitutional may be a
landmark decision. The few previous challenges of residency re-
quirements in divorce laws have been unsuccessful.' 2 There is
widespread acceptance of the proposition that it is within a state's
power to impose a residency requirement on those seeking a divorce
in its courts:
[S] tates have the power to superimpose upon the fact of
domicile or residence within the state a requirement that
the domicile or residence continue for a certain period of
time as a prerequisite to a divorce .... 13
Almost all states have included some type of residency require-
ment in their divorce laws. Based on figures prepared by the United
6. See generally Wis. STAT. § 245.001 et seq.
7. See generally WIs. STAT. §§ 247.03-.39.
8. The Wisconsin Family Code (WIS. STAT. § 245.001 et seq.) requires
the involvement of the Family Court Commissioner in divorce actions. In
particular Wis. STAT. § 247.15 requires that the Commissioner advise the
court as to the merits of a cause of action for divorce.
9. Wymelenberg v. Syman, 328 F. Supp. 1353, 1354 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
Plaintiff's action for divorce was dismissed on the basis that the court "had
no jurisdiction because plaintiff failed to fulfill the two year waiting pe-
riod." Id. For further discussion of the concept that a court is without jur-
isdiction to grant a divorce when the plaintiff fails to satisfy a residency re-
quirement see notes 89-92 and accompanying text infra.
10. Apparently plaintiff was seeking an order declaring the Wiscon-
sin residency requirement invalid via a declaratory judgment (28 U.S.C.
§ 2201) and an injunction barring further enforcement of the statute (28
U.S.C. § 2281).
11. Wymelenberg v. Syman, 328.F. Supp. 1353, 1354 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
12. See, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 123 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 1960); Robinson v.
Robinson, 70 Idaho 122, 212 P.2d 1031 (1949); Hensley v. Hensley, 286 Ky.
378, 151 S.W.2d 69 (1941); Franklin v. Franklin, 40 Mont. 348, 106 P. 353
(1910); Worthington v. Worthington, 37 Nev. 212, 142 P. 230 (1914); Pugh v.
Pugh, 25 S.D. 7, 124 N.W. 959 (1910).
13. 24 AM. JuR. 2d Divorce and Separation § 248 (1966). See also
27A C.J.S. Divorce § 75 (1959).
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States Department of Labor for 1965, every state except New York
has included a residency requirement in its divorce statute. 14 The
length of time varies. Among the shortest are Arkansas (2
months) 15 and Utah (3 months)." The longest residency require-
ment is impossed by Massachusetts (5 years).17 The most common
residency requirement is one year (25 states) 1I although eight states
have a residency requirement longer than one year. 19 Given the
almost universal presence of residency requirements in divorce
statutes, the impact of the Wymelenberg decision will be wide-
spread if accepted in other jurisdictions.
Although the Wymelenberg decision is a radical departure from
past judicial treatment of residency requirements in divorce stat-
utes,20 the court felt its holding was required in light of two recent
United States Supreme Court decisions: Boddie v. Connecticut
2'
and Shapiro v. Thompson.
22
The Shapiro case dealt with several state statutes23 which de-
nied public assistance to applicants who had not resided in that
state for at least one year immediately prior to applying for public
assistance.24 In Shapiro the United States Supreme Court held that
14. AM. JuR. 2d DESK BOOK, Doc. No. 125 (Supp. 1971); See also 24
AM. JuH. 2d, Divorce and Separation § 248 (1966) for a discussion of the
various types of residency requirements imposed by the state divorce laws.
15. AM. Jue. 2d DESK BOOK, Doc. No. 125 (Supp. 1971).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. Included among those states which impose a one year resi-
dency requirement is Pennsylvania. PA. STAT. tit. 23, § 16 (Supp. 1971) pro-
vides:
No spouse shall be entitled to commence proceedings for divorce
by virtue of this act who shall not have been a bona fide resident in
this Commonwealth at least one whole year immediately previous
to the filing of his or her petition or libel: Provided, That, if the
proceedings for divorce are commenced in the county where the re-
spondent has been a bona fide resident at least one whole year im-
mediately previous to the filing of such proceedings, in such case,
residence of the libellant within the county or State for any period
shall not be required.
19. AM. JUR. 2d, DESK BOOK, Doc. No. 125 (Supp. 1971).
20. See cases cited note 12 supra.
21. 91 S. Ct. 780 (1971).
22. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
23. The three statutes under attack in Shapiro were those of Con-
necticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 17-2d (Supp. 1965), the District of Co-
lumbia, D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-203 (1967), and Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. tit. 62,
§ 432(6) (1968).
24. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). The majority in Shapiro limited its decision to
the facts before it. To emphasize this point the court stated:
We imply no view of the validity of waiting-period or residence
requirements determining eligibility to vote, eligibility for tuition-
free education, to obtain a license to practice a profession, to hunt
or fish and so forth. Such requirements may promote compelling
the statutes in question "penalized"2 5 the exercise of a "fundamental
right 18 by a class of individuals dependent on public assistance.
The fundamental right penalized was "the right to travel inter-
state. '27 Since a "fundamental right" was involved, the Court
applied the strict "compelling state interest" test to determine if
equal protection was being denied. The Court held that there was
no "compelling state interest"28s involved, therefore the imposition
of a one year residency requirement as a precondition for receiving
welfare benefits constituted a denial of equal protection.
29
The second case which the Wymelenberg court deemed control-
ling was Boddie v. Connecticut." In the Boddie case the United
States Supreme Court held unconstitutional a provision of the
Connecticut divorce law which made access to the courts for a di-
vorce contingent on payment of various fees and costs. 3 1 The ma-
state interests on the one hand, or, on the other, may not be penal-
ties upon the exercise of the constitutional right of interstate travel.
Id. at 638 n.21. For a further discussion of the impact of Shapiro despite
the Court's limitation of its holding, see note 62 infra.
25. 394 U.S. at 634. In speaking of "penalizing" the right to travel the
majority has caused great confusion among the courts and commentators
concerning what effect on the right to travel will be unconstitutional.
This problem is discussed at notes 65-73 and accompanying text infra.
26. 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969). The term "fundamental right" has been
used in treatment of constitutional challenges based on equal protection.
In cases where a "fundamental" right is affected the traditional test for
equal protection i.e., the "rational basis" test has been discarded in favor
of the stricter test of whether the state interest being promoted is a compel-
ling one. For an excellent discussion of the development of the "compelling
interest" test and the decline of the "rational basis" test see Mr. Justice
Harlan's dissenting opinion in Shapiro, 394 U.S. 618, 658-62 (1969). --See also
Developments In The Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. Ruv. 1065 (1969).
27. 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969). The majority provides little in the way of
the background of the right to travel. In fact, the majority found that it
was unable to "ascribe the source of this right to travel interstate to a par-
ticular constitutional provision." Id. at 630 (footnotes omitted). For a more
complete development of the background of the "right to travel interstate"
see Mr. Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Shapiro. Id. at 663-667.
See also Developments In The Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAmy. L. REv.
1065 (1969).
It is interesting that the majority devoted so little concern to the mean-
ing of the "right to travel interstate." It appears that Mr. Chief Justice
Warren, with whom Mr. Justice Black joined in dissenting from the hold-
ing in Shapiro, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) was correct when he stated:
The Courts decision reveals only the top of the iceberg. Lurk-
ing beneath are the multitude of situations in which States have
imposed residence requirements including eligibility to vote, to en-
gage in certain professions or to attend a state supported univer-
sity.
Id. at 655.
28. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). The interests which the states argued were
"compelling" were mainly concerned with fiscal integrity. Id. at 638. The
states also argued that the residency requirements encouraged early entry
into the labor force by new arrivals. Id. at 639. Finally it was asserted
that the residency requirements prevented welfare fraud by new arrivals,
i.e., prevented an individual from receiving welfare payments from more
than one state at one time. Id. at 634.
29. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
30. 91 S. Ct. 780 (1971).
31. The fees involved in the Boddie case were required by CONN. GEN.
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jority 2 held that because the Connecticut statutes in effect denied
indigents the right to obtain a divorce, they constituted a denial of
due process.33 The majority rested its decision on several elements
unique to divorce. Among these was the basic importance of mar-
riage in our society.3 4 The court spoke of marriage as a "funda-
mental human relationship. '3 5 Also of significant importance to
the majority was the fact that the state had monopolized all vi-
able means of dissolving the marriage relationship. 6 Since there
were no meaningful alternatives to divorce, anyone seeking to dis-
solve his marriage was forced to utilize the judicial machinery.
The majority concluded that denying access to the courts, the only
means of obtaining a divorce, because of indigency constituted a
denial of due process.
37
The Wymelenberg court rested its decision primarily on the
Boddie and Shapiro decisions. The court first recognized that as
in Boddie and Shapiro, a discriminatory classification had been
created by the Wisconsin residency requirement. In the words of
the court:
In the case at hand, Wisconsin by legislation has granted
access to its divorce courts to "bona fide residents" who
have lived in the state for at least two years but has de-
nied similar access to "bona fide residents," such as plain-
tiff, who have not yet lived in the state for that length of
timeAs
The court described this discrimination as affecting those who
STAT. REV. § 52-259 (Supp. 1971-72) (filing fees) and the costs were those
required for service. CoNN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 52-261 (Supp. 1971-72).
32. 91 S. Ct. 780, 783-89 (1971).
33. Id. Although the majority in Boddie rested its decision solely on
a due process argument, the concurring opinions questioned this reasoning.
Mr. Justice Douglas felt that the basis for the decision should be only equal
protection. Id. at 789-90 (concurring opinion). Mr. Justice Brennan agreed
with the majority that due process had been violated, but added that so had
the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. Id. at 790-92 (concur-
ring opinion).
34. 91 S. Ct. 780, 784, 788 (1971). For further examples of cases which
have held that marriage in our society will be protected from encroachment
see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Skinner v. State of Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Meyer v. State of Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923);
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
35. 91 S. Ct. 780, 788 (1971).
36. Id. at 784-85. Mr. Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion, id.
at 790-92, criticized the court for its dependence on the idea that this case
was special because the state held a monopoly over the means of dissolv-
ing the marital relationship. Id. at 791.
37. For a discussion of the holding in Boddie see, e.g., Gold, The Poor
And Divorce: Boddie v. Connecticut, 3 FAMLY L.J. 281 (1969).
38. 328 F. Supp. 1353, 1354-5 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
"have recently moved into the jurisdiction." 9
In applying the Boddie rationale to this type of discrimination,
the Wymelenberg court reiterated the Boddie emphasis on the rights
being affected. Speaking of marriage in terms such as "a funda-
mental human relationship" 40 and one of the "basic civil rights of
man, '41 the court paraphrased Boddie by stating:
Thus, when the state, exercising its established prerogative
of overseeing this most important social institution, chooses
to limit access to the courts in this area to only one segment
of its citizenry, the court is duty bound to carefully weigh
the rationales for such limitations and to investigate
whether adequate alternatives are available either to the
state or to its citizens.
42
The court pointed out that no meaningful alternatives to a di-
vorce existed in Wisconsin. The court noted that a "physical sepa-
ration either formal or informal cannot be said to be a meaningful
alternative to a divorce. . . . "4 The court pointed out that a phy-
sical separation in no way terminates the marital relation.44 Sim-
ilarly, the court rejected annulment as a meaningful alternative to
divorce since the grounds for a divorce and annulment are signifi-
cantly different in Wisconsin.
45
The Wymelenberg court stated that, as in Boddie, the proper
constitutional standard by which to test the Wisconsin residency
requirement against the requirements of due process was the "over-
riding significance test."46 But, unlike the majority in Boddie, the
Wymelenberg court implied that the Wisconsin residency require-
ment was also a denial of equal protection.47 Although only dis-
cussing this idea in a note, the court stated that Boddie stands
for the proposition that "access to the divorce courts" is a "funda-
mental right" and as such can only be limited if the state interest
being promoted is a "compelling" interest.
4 8
39. Id. at 1355.
40. Id. at 1354.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1355.
44. Limiting a plaintiff to a physical separation, formal or informal
has serious practical ramifications. The duty of support will be affected as
well as the right to remarry. Furthermore a child born to the wife even
while separated from her husband will generally be presumed to be the hus-
band's child.
45. 328 F. Supp. 1353, 1355 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
46. Id. at 1356 n.7. The approach to a question involving due process
is to measure the rights affected against the interest which the state has in
mind in enacting the statute. Where rights protected by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment are restricted, the statute will be
stricken "absent a countervailing state interest of overriding significance.
." Id. For a further discussion of the scope of the due process clause
and the very real conflict among the authorities on this subject, compare
the majority opinion in Boddie v. Connecticut by Mr. Justice Harlan with
the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas. 91 S. Ct, 780, 789 (1971).
47. 328 F. Supp. 1353, 1356 n.6 (E.D. Wis. 1971).




Several interesting issues arise from the Wymelenberg court's
application of the Boddie rationale. First, the mention of Boddie
as authority for an equal protection argument is not supported by
the majority opinion in Boddie.49 The majority in Boddie limited
its discussion to the due process issue. The only authority for an
equal protection argument is found in the concurring opinions
of Mr. Justice Douglas5" and Mr. Justice Brennan. 51 Furthermore,
the equal protection violation pointed out by both Mr. Justice Doug-
las and Mr. Justice Brennan in Shapiro was the fact that access to
the courts was being limited on the basis of wealth.52 In the pres-
ent case, the limitation is based on length of residence. Whether
an equal protection argument based solely on discrimination arising
from length of residence (absent the arguments presented in Sha-
piro regarding the right to travel53) and affecting access to the
divorce courts would be accepted by the courts has not been con-
clusively decided.
54
Secondly, the applicability of Boddie to the due process argu-
ment in Wymelenberg is also questionable. In Boddie, the effect of
the Connecticut statutes could readily be seen as a permanent exclu-
sion from the divorce courts. Access to the court was conditioned on
the ability to pay, and it is conceivable that a large number of
indigents would never be able to afford a divorce. However, in
Wymelenberg, the maximum exclusion from the divorce courts is
two years. Such a difference may be sufficient to distinguish the
two cases. The majority in Boddie did limit its decision:
We do not decide that access for all individuals to the
courts is a right that is, in all circumstances, guaranteed by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
so that its exercise may not be placed beyond the reach of
any individual .... 5
Furthermore, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Black, in his dissenting
opinion in Boddie, the decision by the majority is an expansion of
due process. 56 Whether the Court will limit any extension of Bod-
die remains to be seen.
The court in the present case had little difficulty in applying
49. 91 S. Ct. 780, 783-89 (1971).
50. Id. at 789-90 (concurring opinion).
51. Id. at 790-92 (concurring opinion).
52. Id. at 790, 791 (concurring opinion).
53. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
54. See cases cited note 63 infra wherein even when the question of
a "right to travel" (Shapiro) was raised, discrimination based on length of
residency was held to be constitutionally permissible.
55. 91 S. Ct. 780, 788 (1971).
56. Id. at 792-94 (dissenting opinion).
the rationale of Shapiro v. Thompson. 7 The court noted that the
discrimination worked by the Wisconsin residency requirement
was against those who "have recently moved into the jurisdic-
tion." 1s Thus, the court concluded that according to the holding in
Shapiro, the Wisconsin residency requirement affected a "funda-
mental right,"59 that being "the right to travel interstate."60
Therefore, to satisfy the requirements of equal protection, Wiscon-
sin would have to show that its residency requirement promoted
a "compelling state interest." 61
The Wymelenberg court offers no discussion of the background
of the "fundamental right to travel interstate" nor does it cite any
other cases which have applied the Shapiro rationale. The effect of
the United States Supreme Court's application of the "right to
travel" in Shapiro has had a devastating effect on residency re-
quirements of all types.62 However, it is not beyond dispute that
the Shapiro holding mandates that every residency requirement,
including the one in the present case be struck down as uncon-
stitutional. 63
As noted above, the majority in Shapiro limited its decision to
residency requirements related to the receipt of public assistance,
and expressly avoided a holding that all residency requirements
were unconstitutional. 4 Courts have therefore, when faced with
a residency requirement question, been forced to analyze just how
far the Shapiro decision expands the "right to travel interstate."
At one point in the Shapiro decision the Court speaks of resi-
dency requirements which "penalize" 65 the right to travel. Taken
literally it is plain to see that all residency requirements in effect
"penalize" the right to travel. One commentator has suggested that
57. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
58. Wymelenberg v. Syman, 328 F. Supp. 1353, 1355 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
59. Id. at 1356 n.6.
60. Id. For a discussion of the background of the "fundamental right
to travel interstate" see note 27 supra.
61. 328 F. Supp. 1353, 1356 n.6 (E.D. Wis. 1971). For a discussion of the
development of the "compelling interest" test see note 26 supra.
62. See, e.g., Cole v. Housing Authority of City of Newport, 435 F.2d
807 (1st Cir. 1970) (two year residency requirement imposed on applicants
for admission to federally-aided, low rent, public housing unconstitutional);
Bufford v. Holton, 319 F. Supp. 843 (E.D. Va. 1970) (one year residency re-
quirement to vote in general election unconstitutional); Keenan v. North
Carolina Board of Law Examiners, 317 F. Supp. 1350 (D.N.C. 1970) (resi-
dency requirement to take bar examination unconstitutional); Arnold v.
Halifax Hospital District, 314 F. Supp. 277 (M.D. Fla. 1970) (residency re-
quirement for free medical assistance unconstitutional).
63. Various cases have rejected the applicability of the Shapiro and
held residency requirements constitutional. See, e.g. Lane v. McGarry, 320
F. Supp. 562 (N.D.N.Y. 1970) (upholding one year residency requirement for
admission to public housing); Howe v. Brown, 319 F. Supp. 862 (N.D. Ohio
1970) (residency requirement for statewide non-presidential election consti-
tutional).
64. See note 24 supra.
65. 394 U.S. 618, 631, 634 (1969).
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the majority in Shapiro did not intend such a broad holding.
66
Besides the expression that they did not infer by their decision
that every residency requirement was unconstitutional,67 the major-
ity emphasized the very real deterrent effect of the statutes un-
der discussion. The majority stated:
We do not doubt that the one year waiting period de-
vice is well suited to discourage the influx of poor families
in need of assistance. An indigent who desires to migrate,
resettle, find a new job, and start a new life will doubtless
hesitate if he knows that he must risk making the move
without the possibility of falling back on state welfare as-
sistance during his first year of residence when his need
may be most acute.68
Therefore it is not enough that the right to travel be in some
way affected or "penalized." There must be a real possibility of
deterrence. This argument is based on Shapiro's emphasis on the
importance of welfare to an indigent, comprising "the ability of the
families to obtain the very means to subsist .... -69 Thus, the
right to travel is not merely penalized, but due to the essential na-
ture of the underlying interest affected (in the Shapiro case-wel-
fare), the right to travel is actually deterred. In other words,
By relying on the fact that the classification deterred ra-
ther than penalized the exercise of the right to travel, the
Court has limited the application of its reasoning to those
cases where the underlying benefit is fundamental in na-
turej
0
Applying this approach to Wymelenberg, the question is not
merely whether the right to travel is "penalized." Obviously it is.
The inquiry should be, is there any real deterrent effect, or con-
versely, is access to the divorce courts so essential that sufficient
deterrence as opposed to a mere penalty can be inferred. If this
approach is adopted, the issue would be whether or not the right
to travel is deterred by the imposition of a two year residency re-
quirement in a divorce statute.
The interpretation of Shapiro outlined above has been rejected
by some courts71 but seemingly accepted by others. 72 Several courts
66. Note, Shapiro v. Thompson: Travel Welfare and the Constitu-
tion, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 989 (1969).
67. See note 24 supra.
68. 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969).
69. Id. at 627.
70. Note, Shapiro v. Thompson: Travel Welfare and the Constitution,
44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 989, 1003 (1969).
71. In Cole v. Housing Authority of City of Newport, 435 F.2d 807 (1st
Cir. 1970), the court discussed and rejected the concept of limiting Shapiro
have defined Shapiro only as authority for the proposition that any
residency requirement whose purpose is to exclude a class of individ-
uals from the state is unconstitutional, and avoided the question
of what type of underlying right is affected by a limitation of
the right to travel.7 3  Perhaps the only safe conclusion in light of
the above rationale is that at the present time residency require-
ments cannot be defined as unconstitutional per se on the basis of
Shapiro.
7 4
Adopting the reasoning in both Boddie and Shapiro which re-
quires a state interest to be "a countervailing state interest of over-
riding significance"7 5 if tested against the requirements of due proc-
ess, or to be a "compelling interest"7 6 if tested against the require-
ments of equal protection, the Wymelenberg court reviewed four
interests offered by Wisconsin to justify the residency requirement.
The first reason offered by the state was "to deter those with
marital problems from entering the state."77 The Wymelenberg
court quickly disposed of this state interest. Citing Shapiro, the
court stated, "it is impermissible for a state to attempt to chill an
individual's constitutional right to travel and settle in the state of
his choice.' '7 It is interesting to note that at no time in Shapiro
to cases wherein the underlying interest affected is essential, e.g. public as-
sistance. The court stated:
Because the Court has shown no inclination to look to the difficult
factual issue of whether or not a fixed level of deterrence exists and
because it does not restrict its ruling in Shapiro to situations where
the necessities of life are involved, we are inclined to reject [the]
presumption of deterrence and adopt instead the Court's suggestion
that restrictions which penalize travel require a compelling state
interest.
Id. at 810 n.9. See also Kohn v. Davis, 320 F. Supp. 246 (D. Vt. 1970) (one
year residency requirement as prerequisite to right to vote held unconstitu-
tional).
72. In Kirk v. Board of Regents of Univ. of California, 273 Cal. App. 2d
430, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 554 (1970), a statute
which required a one year residency before a student would be eligible for
a reduced tuition was held constitutional. Although the right to travel was
not the only issue raised in the case, the court did discuss the applicability
of Shapiro. The court held that the right to travel was not deterred by the
residency requirement. Id. at 266. Of importance to the present case was
the fact that the court distinguished the Shapiro case by examining the un-
derlying rights affected, i.e. reduced tuition versus welfare. The court felt
this was a controlling distinction. Id. at 267. See also, Board of Supervis-
ors, Pima County v. Robinson, 10 Ariz. App. 238, 457 P.2d 951 (1969),
vacated as moot, 105 Ariz. 280, 463 P.2d 536 (1970) (holding unconstitutional
a residency requirement for free out-patient medical care).
73. See, e.g., Howe v. Brown, 319 F. Supp. 862 (N.D. Ohio 1970) (up-
holding one year residency requirement for voting); Vaughn v. Bower, 313
F. Supp. 37 (D. Ariz. 1970).
74. For further discussion of the holding in Shapiro see, e.g., Rosen-
heim, Shapiro v. Thompson: "The Beggars Are Coming To Town," THE S.
CT. REV. at 303 (1969); 21 SYRACUSE L. REV. 303 (1969).
75. See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
76. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
77. Wymelenberg v. Syman, 328 F. Supp. 1353, 1355 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
78. Id. at 1355.
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did the states allege that their purpose in adopting the residency
requirements was to deter entry of indigents into the state. It was
the Supreme Court's own conclusion that such an intent existed.
The majority in Shapiro stated, "there is weighty evidence that
exclusion from the jurisdiction of the poor who need or may need
relief was the specific objective of these provisions. ' 79 Although
the Court in Shapiro attacked the residency requirements for such
an intent stating, "the purpose of inhibiting migration by needy
persons into the State is unconstitutionally impermissible,"8 0 the
applicability of the Shapiro case is still open to question. It is
clear that in Shapiro the Court did not strike down the residency
requirements merely because it found that its purpose was to ex-
clude indigents. Furthermore, as discussed above, several courts
have suggested that it is the underlying right which is affected and
not merely the penalizing of the right to travel which is con-
trolling.8 1
A second interest offered by Wisconsin in the present case was
"to maintain marital stability. '8 2 The state argued that the resi-
dency requirement served as a "waiting period" prior to obtaining
a divorce. The court responded to this contention by stating that
"this logic would also require a similar waiting period for long term
residents of the State. 8s 3 Although never mentioned by the court,
Wisconsin has a 60 day waiting period in its divorce laws8 4 and
also provides for the Family Court Commissioner to attempt re-
conciliation. 5 The court also suggests that it would be permissible
to impose a waiting period running from the date of marriage
within which no action for divorce could be commenced.8 6 Such a
waiting period would promote marital stability and in no way
discriminate against those who have recently moved into the juris-
diction.
7
The third interest offered by the state was that the residency
requirement was justifiable as evidence of domicile. 8 The Wymel-
enberg court offered several observations with regard to this "in-
terest." First, the court noted that according to Wisconsin case
79. 394 U.S. 618, 628 (1969).
80. Id. at 629.
81. See note 72 and accompanying text supra.
82. 328 F. Supp. 1353, 1355 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
83. Id. at 1355.
84. WIs. STAT. § 247.081(2)a (Supp. 1971).
85. WIs. STAT. § 247.15(1) (Supp. 1971).
86. 328 F. Supp. 1353, 1355 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
87. For a discussion of various statutory plans involving "cooling off"
periods or waiting periods see Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 1262 (1958).
88. 328 F. Supp. 1353, 1355 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
law, a two year residency before jurisdiction over the divorce ac-
tion will vest in the Wisconsin courts was separate and distinct
from the requirement that the party be a domiciliary of the state.8'
Although the court did not expand on this point, 90 it is important
to the present case as well as any future cases of this nature. The
general rule with regard to state court jurisdiction over a divorce
action is:
A court must have jurisdiction of the res, or the marriage
status, in order that it may grant a divorce. The res or sta-
tus follows the domicile of the spouses; and therefore, in
order that the res may be found within the state so that
the courts of the state may have jurisdiction of it, one of
the spouses must have a domicile within the state.9 '
Since, domicile is the key to jurisdiction of a state court, a re-
quirement of residence in a non-domiciliary degree should in no
way affect jurisdiction.
The court noted the necessity of domicile as a jurisdictional
prerequisite but rejected the mandatory two year residency re-
quirement as the only means of establishing legal residence.
[E]ven if it is conceded that waiting periods are of some
evidentiary value in determining domicile, under this ra-
tionale § 247.05 (3) [the two year residency requirement]
would amount to an irrebutable presumption that a domi-
cile cannot be established in less than two years. "Far
less drastic means" of determining domicile are available
to a trial court possessing full subpoena powers and the ad-
vices of a Family Court Commissioner.
92
Even in those states in which the divorce statutes speak only
of "residency" requirements, as opposed to domicile, as a basis for
jurisdiction of the courts, the reasoning of Wymelenberg will still
be applicable. The general rule is that "[t]he term 'residence'
as used in statutes stating the prerequisites for the maintenance
of a divorce action, is usually construed as equivalent to domicile."98
Therefore, the Wymelenberg holding that "an irrebuttable presump-
tion that a domicile cannot be established in less than two years,1
9 4
would be equally applicable.
The final interest which Wisconsin proposed was treated by
the court in a similar manner. The state argued that its "reputa-
89. Id. at 1355.
90. The court implies consideration of this factor in its discussion of
the states fourth "interest." See text accompanying note 95 inlra.
91. 12 Am. Jun. 2d Divorce and Separation § 246 (1966) (footnotes
omitted). See also, 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 71a (1959).
92. 328 F. Supp. 1353, 1355 (E.D. Wis. 1971) (footnotes omitted).
93. 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 71b (1959). See also, 12 P.L.E. Divorce § 2
(1959). In discussing the Pennsylvania one year residency requirement (PA.
STAT. tit. 23, § 16 (Supp. 1971) ) the authors state: "The statute, in using the
term "residence," means domicile, which is dependent upon both the actual
residence and the intent of the plaintiff." Id. (footnotes omitted).
94. 328 F. Supp. 1353, 1355 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
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tion will suffer as it will become a quickie divorce mill." The court,
defining a "quickie divorce mill" as a "jurisdiction which grants
divorces to visitors as opposed to permanent residents or domicil-
iaries," held that such a result could be easily avoided by applying
the law of domicileY
5
The court concluded its examination of the four state inter-
ests by stating:
[T]he prior mandates of the United States Supreme Court
compel us to find, whether judged by the equal protec-
tion clause "compelling interest" test or by the due proc-
ess clause "overriding significance" test that § 247.05(3)'s
two year waiting period requirement constitutes an uncon-
stitutional impingement upon the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution. 6
By such a blanket statement the court avoided the task of specify-
ing which state interests failed under due process and which failed
under equal protectionY7 Also, it is impossibile to determine if
the court felt Boddie (due process) or Shapiro (equal protection)
controlled via a combination of the decisions, or whether each
decision by itself mandated the Wymelenberg holding.
As noted earlier, the number of states with residency require-
ments is high. The effect on these states remains to be seen. If the
Wymelenberg decision is followed, the state will have several op-
tions. As suggested in Wymelenberg, the law of domicile should
prevent a state from being forced to grant divorces to mere visitors.
In uncontested divorces the state may wish to devise stricter tests
of domiciliary intent. Whether a state under the Wymelenberg rea-
soning will be able to impose any type of residency requirement
as proof of domicile remains to be seen. The Wymelenberg court
specifically exempted the 30 day provision in § 247.05(3).", How
long a period could be demanded as evidence of domicile remains
unanswered.
In conclusion, it is important to recognize that the Wymelen-
berg decision may be subject to attack. As noted throughout, the
Wymelenberg court ignored numerous issues raised by other cases
95. For an examination of evidentiary questions in establishing domi-
cile see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 11-23 (1971).
96. 328 F. Supp. 1353, 1356 (E.D. Wis. 1971) (footnotes omitted).
97. Considering the apparent confusion within the United States Su-
preme Court over what constitutes a denial of due process and what consti-
tutes a denial of equal protection, the courts action is understandable. See,
e.g., Developments In The Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065
(1969).
98. 328 F. Supp. 1353, 1354 n.2 (E.D. Wis. 1971). See note 3 supra.
which have attempted to apply both Boddie and Shapiro. The




OF BLOOD SAMPLE INCIDENT TO ARREST
Commonwealth v. Murray, 441 Pa. 22, 271 A.2d 500 (1970).
In Commonwealth v. Murray,1 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court strictly applied the present United States Supreme Court
standards for testing the validity of a warrantless search incident
to arrest. The court held that the taking of a blood sample without
a search warrant thirteen days prior to the serving of an arrest
warrant violated the fourth amendment prohibition against un-
reasonable searches.2 The majority and dissenting opinions clearly
reflected the current controversy with respect to the proper in-
terpretation of the fourth amendment.
Petitioner Robert Murray crossed the center line of a highway
and collided head-on with another vehicle containing a driver and
one passenger. Both occupants of the other car died a few hours
later. The state trooper who investigated the accident found beer
bottles in the Murray car and testified that "he and the car reeked
with alcohol."'3 The trooper sent the severely injured but con-
scious Murray to the hospital and remained at the scene of the
accident to complete his investigation and traffic duties. How-
ever, he radioed the police station and asked that the hospital be
instructed to make a blood test on Murray.
A blood sample was taken approximately one hour and
forty minutes after the accident.4 This was done without placing
Murray under arrest, without his consent,5 and without a search
1. 441 Pa. 22, 271 A.2d 500 (1970).
2. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV provides in part:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable search and seizure shall
not be violated.
3. Commonwealth v. Murray, 19 Cumb. 2, 3 (Pa. C.P. 1968).
4. See note 24 infra for information on rate at which alcohol is
eliminated from the blood stream.
5. This prosecution arose before the passage of the Pennsylvania
Implied Consent Law. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 624.1 (Supp. 1971).
Whether the defendant in Murray would be permitted to avail himself of
that statute is an open question. Part (a) of the statute states that the
statute specifically applies to persons "charged with the operation of a
motor vehicle or tractor while under the influence of intoxicating liquor."
Murray was charged with involuntary manslaughter.
The statute also provides:
If for any reason a person is unable to supply enough breath
to complete a chemical test a physician or a technician acting under
warrant. Tests on the sample showed an alcohol content of
2.06 milligrams per cubic centimeter.6 A complaint was filed the
following day and a warrant for Murray's arrest issued. However,
Murray was not served with the warrant until he was discharged
from the hospital thirteen days after the accident.
A pretrial motion to suppress the blood test evidence was de-
nied. An objection to the evidence at trial was overruled and
Murray was found guilty. A motion for a new trial was denied.7
The defendant appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court which
affirmed the decision of the lower court per curiam without opin-
ion.8
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in a four to three decision,
reversed the decision of the superior court and ordered a new
trial.9 The majority strictly applied the present search and seizure
doctrine that a search incident to arrest must be substantially con-
temporaneous with the arrest.10 The dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Pomeroy, which was joined by Mr. Justice Jones and Mr.
Justice Bell, stated that the conduct of the police in the present
case was reasonable under the circumstances and should be judged
by standards of reasonableness.' The majority and dissenting
opinions present two views of the proper interpretation of the un-
reasonable search and seizure clause of the fourth amendment.
A brief survey of major United States Supreme Court decisions
concerning warrantless search incident to arrest, with stress on
his direction may withdraw blood for the purpose of determining
the alcoholic content therein. Consent is hereby given by such
persons. The chemical analysis of the blood taken under such cir-
cumstances shall be admissible in evidence.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75 § 624.1(f) (Supp. 1971). This provision might
have been applied in Murray since the left side of the defendant's face
was crushed and facial bones broken. 19 Cumb. 2, 3 (Pa. C.P. 1968).
In California, where the crime of driving while intoxicated and thereby
proximately causing bodily injury to another is a felony, it has been held
that a blood test can be lawfully made in such circumstances despite the
California implied consent law and defendant's express objection to the
test. People v. Fite, 267 Cal. App. 2d 685,73 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1968).
For a complete analysis of the Pennsylvania Implied Consent Law
see Comment, The Pennsylvania Implied Consent Law: Problems Arising
in a Criminal Proceeding, 74 DICK. L.R. 219 (1970).
6. Therefore the amount of alcohol by weight in the blood was
0.206 per cent. At the time of this prosecution, a person was presumed to
be under the influence of intoxicating liquor if his blood-alcohol level was
0.15 per cent or more. Act of July 28, 1961, No. 399, [1961] Pa. Laws 918.
This presumption now applies if the amount of alcohol in the blood is 0.10
per cent or more. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75 § 624.1(c) (Supp. 1970).
7. Commonwealth v. Murray, 19 Cumb. 2 (Pa. C.P. 1968).
8. Commonwealth v. Murray, 215 Pa. Super. 745, 255 A.2d 594
(1969).
9. Upon retrial, Murray was again convicted on the basis of eye
witness testimony. No. 11 (Cumb. Co. 0 & T, Mar. Sess. 1968).
10. Commonwealth v. Murray, 441 Pa. 22, 25, 271 A.2d 500, 501 (1970).
See notes 16-21 and accompanying text infra.




cases where a blood sample was taken, will place the Murray deci-
sion in proper perspective. Prior to Mapp v. Ohio,12 the only
Constitutional protection afforded citizens in state courts against
unreasonable search and seizure was the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. It protected all citizens from searches of
the person done in a manner that shocked the conscience or of-
fended a sense of justice.1 3 On the basis of this test the Court
allowed the warrantless taking of blood incident to arrest in Breit-
haupt v. Abramn.14 Mapp applied the exclusionary rule, that evi-
dence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment must be
suppressed, to all state criminal prosecutions.1 5
Of the various requirements that a search incident to arrest
must now meet, the one most relevant to Murray was the specifi-
cation set down in Stoner v. California"" that the "search can be
incident to an arrest only if it is substantially contemporaneous
with the arrest and confined to the immediate vicinity of the ar-
rest."' 7 The Court stated that while there is some leeway in
these concepts, the search of defendant's hotel room in California
two days before he was arrested in Nevada was unrelated in both
time and place to the arrest.1 8 Recent cases that have held searches
invalid for violation of the time and place requirement have
tended to place more emphasis on the place than the time.1 9 A
Supreme Court case decided after Mapp, Schmerber v. California,
had facts very close to Murray, yet made no mention of the time
requirement.20 Therefore the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had
12. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
13. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1962) (conviction based
on evidence obtained by pumping defendant's stomach overturned).
14. 352 U.S. 432 (1957). The opinion placed special emphasis on the
fact that blood tests are routine in today's medical procedure and are re-
quired in many physical examinations. Id. at 436. Slaughter on the high-
ways and the prominent role played by the drunk driver in this carnage
were also mentioned as reasons for holding that the warrantless taking of
a blood sample was not violative of the fourteenth amendment. 352 U.S.
at 440.
15. 367 U.S. 643. 660 (1961).
16. 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
17. Id. at 486.
18. Id. at 487.
19. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970) (Defendant was arrested
on the front steps of his house; a search of the entire house was held not
incident to the arrest); Shipley v. California, 395 U.S. 818 (1969) (Defend-
ant was arrested at the curb in front of his house; a search of the house
15 or 20 feet away was held not incident to the arrest). See also Warden,
Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) and James v. Lou-
isiana, 382 U.S. 36 (1965). All cases cited the time and place requirement
from Stoner.
20. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). See notes 22-27
and accompanying text infra.
little clear precedent for approving or disapproving the thirteen
day lapse in Murray.
2 1
The United States Supreme Court examined the validity of a
warrantless taking of blood incident to an arrest after fourth
amendment protection was made applicable to state criminal prose-
cutions. In Schmerber v. California,22 the Court ruled that such a
search is valid under certain circumstances. 23 It held that a war-
rantless search incident to arrest was permissible when it was
reasonably apparent that the defendant was intoxicated and that
the blood alcohol would begin to decrease before a warrant could
be obtained.
24
The Court took judicial notice of the fact that the percentage
of blood alcohol diminishes shortly after drinking stops. 25  The
opinion in Schmerber emphasized that it was applicable only to
situations where the blood was taken in a hospital according to
accepted medical practices.2 6 The policy arguments set down in
Breithaupt v. Abram2 7 were cited to support the contention that
intrusion into a person's body for blood is not repugnant to the
fourth amendment.
In Commonwealth v. Murray, the majority opinion of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court cited Schmerber as authorizing a
blood test made without the consent of the defendant. However
the majority did not find that Schmerber was controlling in this
21. For cases dealing with time delays of similar length, see note 40
and accompanying text infra.
22. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
23. Id. In Schmerber, the defendant was taken to a hospital for
treatment of injuries suffered in an automobile accident. A blood sample
was taken at the hospital without a search warrant and despite the de-
fendant's refusal to consent. The evidence was admitted at trial and the
defendant was convicted of driving while under the influence of intoxicat-
ing liquor. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the
conduct of the police was justified by the circumstances of the case. How-
ever, this case can be distinguished from Murray since the defendant
had been placed under arrest at the scene of the accident.
24. Id. at 770. The principle that a warrantless search incident to
arrest may be made to prevent destruction of the evidence has most re-
cently been stated in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 758 (1969). See
also Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964).
25. Id. at 771. The rate at which blood-alcohol diminishes varies
with such facts as the amount of food in the stomach. However, the fol-
lowing information presents general limits and rates:
Total absorption [of alcohol into the blood stream] will ordi-
narily be completed between 40 and 70 minutes after the final
drink. The rate of elimination from the bloodstream after absorp-
tion varies from person to person. Generally, though, the average
person of 150 pounds of body weight will eliminate about 1/3 fluid
ounce of absolute alcohol per hour and accordingly the concentration
of alcohol in the blood will decrease by approximately 0.015 per
cent per hour.
R.L. DONIGAN, CHEMICAL TESTS AND THE LAw 44 (2d ed. 1966). See gen-
erally AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, ALCOHOL AND THE IMPAIRED DrovER
(1968).
26. Id. at 772.
27. See note 13 supra.
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case. The court held that this search was not incident to a lawful
arrest. It should be noted, however, that the lower court found
that all of the technical requirements of Schmerber were satisfied.
The taking of Murray's blood was done in a reasonable and proper
manner by a trained medical technician in a hospital; 2 the facts
clearly justified the reasonable belief on the part of the police that
probable cause for the search existed;29 and the situation was an
emergency which demanded quick action less the evidence forever
disappear.30 The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Pomeroy also
concluded that Schmerber was applicable to this case.
3 1
The majority of the supreme court in Murray was able to
dispense with the case by strictly interpreting the requirement that
the warrantless search be substantially contemporaneous with the
arrest in order to be valid. The opinion stated that:
While the exigencies of the existing circumstances may ren-
der the search valid even if not strictly contemporaneous
with the arrest, the present situation is not such a case.
Although the altruistic motives of the arresting officer are
to be admired, this, in itself, cannot warrant the conclusion
that the search of Murray's person thirteen days before the
arrest was an "incident" thereto.
32
Thus the majority did not believe the facts of this case compelled
a finding that the police had no other reasonable course but to de-
lay the execution of the warrant.
33
A recent Pennsylvania case, Commonwealth v. Gordon,3 4 cited
by the majority35 and the dissent3" presents an example of "cir-
cumstances which will render a seizure reasonable, even though
it is not strictly confined to the area of arrest or the immediate
time thereof. '37 In this case, police arrested a seriously wounded
murder suspect in his mother's home. He was taken immediately
to the hospital where his clothing and a blood sample taken for
medical purposes were seized without a search warrant. The court
28. Commonwealth v. Murray, 19 Cumb. 2, 5 (Pa. C.P. 1968).
29. Id. at 6.
30. Id.
31. Commonwealth v. Murray, 441 Pa. 22, 27, 271 A.2d 500, 502
(1970).
32. Id. at 25, 271 A.2d at 501.
33. MacDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948). This case
is generally cited for the rule that a search without a warrant may be
justified by the exigencies of the situation. Recent cases citing MacDonald
are Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967)
and Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 (1969).
34. Commonwealth v. Gordon, 431 Pa. 512, 246 A.2d 325 (1968).
35. 441 Pa. at 25, 271 A.2d at 501.
36. Id. at 26, 271 A.2d at 502 (dissenting opinion).
37. Commonwealth v. Gordon, 431 Pa. 512, 518, 246 A.2d 325, 328
(1968).
held that common sense required the police to delay the seizure
until the defendant was moved to a hospital.3 8 Thus, the court
reasoned, the seizure and the arrest can be regarded as parts of an
unbroken transaction. 39 There have been cases in other jurisdic-
tions where a delay of up to nine days between the taking of the
blood sample and the arrest was not deemed an unreasonable
search per se.40 Perhaps the majority in Murray should have
made a closer examination of the facts.
The dissenting opinion was not only willing to consider the
particular facts but placed great emphasis on whether the acts of
the police were unreasonable. 41 Mr. Justice Pomeroy applied an
"unreasonableness" test to the case in the following manner:
I am unable to see how this solicitude for the appellant's
health on the part of the police department can be said to
have rendered the blood test an unreasonable search. It
seems much more unreasonable to require that a person as
severely injured as appellant was be placed under arrest
immediately, and, in consequence, under armed guard dur-
ing the period of his hospital confinement.
42
Thus the dissent made a detailed examination of the facts and
concluded that the conduct of the police was reasonable.
The question of whether the "unreasonable" term of the fourth
amendment should be fitted to a ridged test or applied to each
case on its particular facts is much debated. Chimel v. California
43
indicates a trend toward the former by establishing clear stand-
ards that a warrantless search will have to meet if it is to be
proper.44  However, Mr. Justice Black, in Preston v. United
States45 and Vale v. Louisiana,4 has staunchly supported the idea
that the fourth amendment cannot be properly applied without
considering the reasonableness of the search in light of all circum-
stances present in the case.4 7 The majority and dissenting opin-
ions in Commonwealth v. Murray argued the two sides of this
question as it applied to the case. The majority is in tune with the
present United States Supreme Court's standards.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. People v. Knox, 178 Cal. App. 2d 502, 3 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1960);
State v. Kroening, 274 Wis. 266, 79 N.W.2d 810 (1956). See generally
Annot. 89 A.L.R.2d 715 (1963).
41. Commonwealth v. Murray, 441 Pa. 22, 26, 271 A.2d 500, 502 (1970).
42. Id. at 27, 271 A.2d at 502.
43. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). The area which may be searched was lim-
ited to the arrestee's person and the area within his reach.
44. See 74 DIcK. L.R. 361 (1970).
45. 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
46. 399 U.S. 30 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
47. In Preston, Justice Black stated that common sense dictates that
the search of an automobile cannot be treated the same as an immovable
house. 376 U.S. at 366-67.
In Vale, he reiterated his stand in Preston and said further that
"searches are to be judged by whether they are reasonable" and "common
sense dictates that reasonableness varies with the circumstances of the
case." 399 U.S. at 415 (dissenting opinion).
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In light of the Murray decision, the obvious question arises of
how close in time the arrest must follow the blood taking for the
taking to be "incident to the arrest." Where the offense involved
is a felony, no problem is present because the arrest may be made
on probable cause at the time the suspect is apprehended. 48 But
in the case of a misdemeanor, 49 a police officer may not arrest on
probable cause unless the offense was committed in his presence.50
Thus in a case such as Murray acceptable police procedure is still
undefined. It is not clear whether the search would have been
incident to the arrest if the warrant for arrest had been executed
the same day it was issued, which was the day following the acci-
dent. Nor is it clear whether the police are required to arrest the
suspect before any search may be made.51 If arrest is required,
the same argument arises as that which militates against requiring
a search warrant: during the time a warrant for either the arrest
or search of the defendant is being procured, the evidence is being
dissipated from the suspect's blood stream. Therefore, it would
seem the police ought to be permitted to order a blood test without
a warrant for either arrest or search on the "destructibility of the
evidence"5 2 exception to the general search warrant requirement.
It is submitted that the "search incident to arrest" rule as it is
presently constituted leads to unreasonable demands on the police
and unjust results in cases like Murray. Where the alleged offense
is a misdemeanor and the evidence sought is a blood test, the tak-
ing of the blood should be approved if the requirements of Schmer-
her are met and an arrest warrant is issued and executed within a
reasonable time. Twenty four hours would seem to be reasonable.
This would give the police sufficient time to act and would hardly
be prejudicial to an accused confined to a hospital as the de-
fendant in Murray was. Hopefully the present uncertainty in this
area will be removed by a thorough treatment of the issue the
next time it comes before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
WILLIAM C. GIERASCH
48. Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. 56, 190 A.2d 304 (1963), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 910 (1964).
49. Involuntary manslaughter is a misdemeanor in Pennsylvania. PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 4703 (1939).
50. Commonwealth v. Pincavitch, 206 Pa. Super. 539, 542, 214 A.2d
280, 282 (1965).
51. Appellant raised this issue in his brief and argued, citing Terry
v. United States, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) and Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40
(1968) as authority, that a search prior to an arrest is permissible only
when the police are looking for weapons. Brief for Appellant at 6. How-
ever the better view seems to be that a search prior to an arrest will be
allowed if reasonable grounds for the arrest existed when the officer con-
fronted the suspect. Annot. 89 A.L.R.2d 715 (1963).
52. See note 24 supra.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PENNSYLVANIA'S SURETY
OF THE PEACE STATUTE IS A VIOLATION OF
DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION
Commonwealth v. Miller, 119 Pitts. L.J. 215 (Pa. C.P. 1971)
In Commonwealth v. Miller,1 the President Judge, Family Di-
vision of the Common Pleas Court of Allegheny County declared
the long standing surety of the peace statute unconstitutional de-
claring that the statute violated the due process and equal protec-
tion clauses of the United States-
3 and Pennsylvania Constitutions.
4
In the decision, Judge Brosky departed from what appears to have
been settled Pennsylvania law that surety of the peace is a civil
proceeding.5 After recognizing surety of the peace as a criminal
proceeding, the case held that the expanded protections now af-
forded the criminally accused must be afforded the defendant
charged with surety of the peace. This Note will analyze the na-
ture of the offense as well as the interpretation of due process and
equal protection requirements as applied in Commonwealth v. Mil-
ler.
James R. Miller was arrested after being accused of making
threats proscribed by the surety of the peace statute.6 At the ini-
1. 119 Pitts. L.J. 215 (Pa. C.P. 1971).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 23 (1964). On March 31, 1860 Pub. L.
No. 427 an act to consolidate, revise and amend the laws of this Common-
wealth relating to Penal Proceedings and Pleadings was passed. Under
Title I of the proceedings to detect the commission of crimes, Section 6 pro-
vided:
If any person shall threaten the person of another to wound, kill
or destroy him, or do any harm in person or estate, and the person
threatened shall appear before a justice of the peace, and attest,
on oath or affirmation, that he believes that by such threatening
he is in danger of being hurt in body or estate, such person so
threatening as aforesaid shall be bound over, with one sufficient
surety, to appear at the next sessions, according to law, and in the
meantime to be of his good behavior, and keep the peace towards
all citizens of this Commonwealth. If any person, not being an
officer on duty in the military or naval service of the state or of
the United States, shall go armed with a dirk, dagger, sword or
pistol, or other offensive or dangerous weapon, without reasonable
cause to fear an assault or other injury or violence to his family,
person or property, he may, on complaint of any person having
reasonable cause to fear a breach of the peace therefrom, be re-
quired to find surety of the peace as aforesaid.
3. U.S. CONST. amends. VI and XIV.
4. Pa. CONST. art. 1, §§ 6, 9.
5. Commonwealth v. Taub, 187 Pa. Super. 440 (1958); Commonwealth
v. Cushard, 184 Pa. Super. 193 (1957).
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 23 (1964).
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tial hearing, the justice of the peace found Miller guilty of surety
of the peace and the peace bond was set. When the same came to
trial the Common Pleas Court deemed it unnecessary to pass on the
merits but considered exclusively the constitutional questions
raised by the defendant. The central issue was whether a preven-
tive justice statute could be applied without the accused being in-
dicted by a grand jury and without trial by jury. If found guilty,
the question remained whether the accused could be required to
post a bond or be committed to jail for failure to post such bond.
7
The court found the statute unconstitutional because it elimi-
nated trial by jury as well as indictments and informations. It was
held that the defendant was entitled to these procedural safeguards.
The court found that the accused was incorrectly presumed guilty
solely on the oath of another and exposed to possible economic dis-
crimination.8
In analyzing the Miller decision, the history of surety bonds
bears some relevance. It readily indicates the unaltered passage
from the common law to the modern codes. The surety bond type
of preventive justice originated in England during the reign of
Edward the Third to aid the rural constabulary.9 The first
Pennsylvania statute was passed in 1700 as "an Act about Binding
the Peace."10 This act was a narrower form of preventive justice
dealing with the peace bond and excluding the behavior bond.
The latter form of surety action requires only a proof of ill repute
and still exists in some states.1 ' The Act of 1700 provided the basic
text for the Act of 1860,1" noting only the change of the populace
from King's subjects to citizens of the Commonwealth. The Acts
of 1909,13 were legislated to qualify and administer the Act of 1860.
It was intended to discourage the trivial use of surety of the peace.
The statutory law on surety of the peace remains unchanged since
the amendments in 1909.
Uniformity in the administration of surety of the peace is not
the rule in Pennsylvania due to the lack of detailed procedure and
the general flexibility in hearings conducted by justices of the
peace and district justices.' 4 The action begins with a complaint
7. 119 Pitts. L.J. 215, 216 (Pa. C.P. 1971).
8. Id. at 225.
9. 34 Edw. 3, c. 1 (1360).
10. 1 Smith's Laws 5 (Pa. 1700).
11. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-2-1(1) (1963); VA. CODE ANN. § 19,
1-23 (1960).
12. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 23 (1964).
13. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 24-28.
14. PA. R. Canm. P. (Justices of the Peace) 102-56. While these rules
sworn against the accused by the individual threatened. A warrant
is issued for the arrest of the accused. Once apprehended and
served with the complaint, the accused is released on an appearance
bond for the hearing. 5 At the hearing, the justice of the peace
first attempts a reconciliation to terminate the action. If he is un-
successful in this required action, he then investigates the facts in-
volved in the complaint. If the justice of the peace is satisfied that
the threats were made and the complainant is in actual fear, he
may then set the peace bond at a sum at his discretion. 6 The de-
fendant must post the bond; if he will not or cannot post such bond
he will go to jail. In either event, the case is bound over for the
common pleas court where the action is heard de novo in a sum-
mary proceeding. If the justice of the peace's findings are sus-
tained the bond is continued in an amount and for a duration at
the discretion of the trial judge.
Pennsylvania case law on surety of the peace has been neither
copious nor consistent. Few cases are reported because few go be-
yond the hearing and fewer beyond the common pleas trial.17 An
early reported case of nearly one hundred and fifty years ago,
Commonwealth v. Keeper of the Prison, articulated a position
nearly identical to that of Judge Brosky in Commonwealth v. Mil-
ler:
The argument that a demand of surety of the peace is a
more mild and merciful proceeding than a prosecution by
indictment, is more specious than solid. In effect it gives
to a single magistrate, a power which pertains only to a
court and jury, and deprives the accused of what is his
most inestimable right, the trial by jury.' 8
The same reasoning is evident in Commonwealth v. Franklin,19
the first surety action to go to the superior court. This review
eliminated the application of the peace bond after the acquittal of a
defendant. The court held that "without a trial by a jury of his
peers he found himself adjudged guilty by a judge upon a suspicion
of what he might do and was placed under bond."' 0  This restric-
suggest a structured format exists, they do not go to procedural aspects in-
volving due process and equal protection. They simply get the defendant
into court correctly.
15. PA. R. CRIM. P. (Justices of the Peace) 4001-16. (Generally de-
scribe the mechanics of setting bail bonds).
16. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 24 (1964).
17. Many of the actions involve domestic disputes which are resolved
between arrest and hearing or between hearing and trial. Another reason
for the paucity of reported decisions is the failure of the trial judge to write
an opinion in the summary proceeding.
18. 1 Ash. 140 (Pa. 1828?).
19. 172 Pa. Super. 152, 92 A.2d 272 (1952).
20. Id. at 155, 92 A.2d at 274. The court also noted the extent of the
use of the surety bond in these cases:
The Public Defender, in his excellent brief as amicus curiae,
states that the Report of the Board of Inspectors of the Philadelphia
County Prison for the years 1939 to 1949 indicates that in that
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tion was deemed a punishment and a deprivation of his rights with-
out due process of law.
If the suspicion of a trial judge after a full hearing is insuffi-
cient to allow punishment without trial by jury, then the suspicion
of the complainant should be open to the same criticism. The su-
perior court's fundamental aversion to imprisonment without a de-
termination of guilt by a jury of peers is emphasized at the con-
clusion of Franklin:
Finally we may state of record that the essentially real
basis for our decision is simply that we consider the prac-
tice under review to be wrong. We are of the firm con-
viction that the practice is fundamentally in conflict with
any modem and enlightened view of individual civil
rights; that it offends the spirit and instinct, and the very
letter of due process. The practice of binding after ac-
quittal even if we were to assume a proper historical basis,
which we do not, is an anachronism; it is a vestige of a
social form which has passed and it cannot coexist with
the modern concept of due process; it has been repealed
by change.
21
Shortly after Franklin, the superior court confronted the ques-
tion of procedural requirements for surety of the peace in Common-
wealth v. Cushard22 and Commonwealth v. Taub.23 The court in
both instances disregarded the reasoning of Franklin which gave
strong indication that the entire surety bond action was violative of
due process. 24 The court relied on the presumption of constitution-
ality and the absence of indictment or jury trial for surety of the
peace at common law.
25
Any review of this reasoning must note the United States Su-
preme Court decision in Schick v. United States,26 which held that
the common law treatment of an offense which has become statu-
tory should not bind courts when interpreting the question of the
benefit of jury trial.2 7 The Court noted that factors such as the
period 478 men, after acquittal of criminal charges, were com-
pelled to serve an aggregate of 600 years in the Philadelphia County
Prison in default of bonds aggregating $613,200.
21. Id. at 193, 92 A.2d 292.
22. 184 Pa. Super. 193, 132 A.2d 366 (1957).
23. 187 Pa. Super. 440, 144 A.2d 628 (1958).
24. Note, Peace and Behavior Bonds, 52 VA. LAW REV. 914, 920 (1966)
states:
Read in its broader sense, the Franklin decision declares all behav-
ior bonds unconstitutional because they impose on persons who are
presumed innocent or have been found so.
25. 187 Pa. Super. 440, 444, 144 A.2d 630 (1958).
26. 195 U.S. 65 (1904).
27. Id. at 66, 67.
nature of the offense and the severity of the punishment should
determine the claim for a jury trial.2 This proposition was reit-
erated in District of Columbia v. Clawans,29 where the impact upon
the accused was used in determining whether to follow the com-
mon lawA0
These early cases evidence an apparent reluctance to utilize
the surety of the peace statute and to narrowly delimit surety of
the peace. One ground for the later expansive holdings may be a
different interpretation of the action, as civil rather than criminal.
Critical to the argument of unconstitutionality is this consideration
of the nature of the surety of the peace action. This point received
little attention by the court in Miller.8 1 Judge Brosky concluded in
one line that surety of the peace is criminal. Other courts and writ-
ers have held it to be a civil action.
8 2
Whether other jurisdictions treat surety questions as a crimi-
nal or civil action is obfuscated by the inconsistent manner with
which these courts have handled such matters as jurisdiction 8
and trial conduct.8 4 Surety of the peace is unique and confusing in
that the punishment is not imposed for the actions leading to the
complaint but to prevent possible future offenses. The alleged
actions of the accused constitute the real basis for the imposition
of the bond since the threats must be found to sustain the action.
Thus, the accused is de facto adjudged guilty of assault leading to
the conviction under the surety action in a summary fashion by
the justice of the peace.
If the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considers the impact upon
the defendant as a guide, as the United States Supreme Court
did in Schick,8 5 it will likely conclude that the surety of the peace
28. Id. at 68.
29. 300 U.S. 617 (1937).
30. Id. at 625.
31. 119 Pitts. L.J. 215, 221 (1971).
32. 12 Am. JUR. 2D Breach of Peace, § 47 (1964). "Surety is not a
criminal proceeding, not the prosecution for crime." Note, "Preventive Jus-
tice"--Bonds to Keep the Peace and for Good Behavior, 88 U. PA. L. REV.
331, 336 (1940): "Classifying proceedings for preventive justice are singu-
larly fruitless and inconsistent."; Note, Peace and Behavior Bonds, 52 VA.
L. REv. 918, 928 (1966): Generally the problem is having the court accept
the action as a criminal proceeding.
33. Note, "Preventive Justice"-Bonds to Keep the Peace and for Good
Behavior, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 331, 335 (1940) concluded that from a general
survey of jurisdictions there could be no general rule as to the criminal or
civil nature of surety from the aspect of jurisdictional requirements.
34. Deloohery v. State, 27 Ind. 521 (1967). The action is treated as a
criminal proceeding in regard to defendant testifying in his own behalf.
Davis v. State, 138 Ind. 11, 37 N.E. 397 (1894). The action is civil as to the
instruction to the jury. Re Chambers, 221 Mo. App. 64, 290 S.W. 103 (1926).
The action is criminally administered in regard to court costs. Arnold v.
State, 92 Ind. 187 (1883). The action is prosecuted under a civil burden of
proof.
35. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
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action is criminal. While the procedure is in many ways civil,3 6
the effect of the action upon the accused is similar to a criminal
action. The Supreme Court of Virginia in Fedele v. Common-
wealth37 came to this conclusion: "The result is punishment for
those persons who were unable to give security and must bear the
stigma arising from commitment to jail."3  Therefore, the court
felt that the procedural safeguards afforded the criminally accused
must be given one accused in the surety of the peace action.' 9
Once the surety of the peace action has been established as a
criminal action, the argument for jury trial, indictments, and the
criminal burden of proof flows easily from recent United States Su-
preme Court decisions. In Duncan v. Louisiana,40 the Court de-
clared that it was the task of the state courts to determine the pro-
cedural safeguards that need be applied:
In the absence of an explicit constitutional provision, the
definitional task necessarily falls on the courts, which
must either pass upon the validity of the legislative at-
tempts to identify those petty offenses which are exempt
from jury trial or, where the legislature has not addressed
itself to the problem, themselves face the question in the
first instance. In either case it is necessary to draw a
line in the spectrum of crime, separating petty from seri-
ous infractions.
41
Pennsylvania's Supreme Court has already adopted such a
stance with regard to indictments in Commonwealth v. Cano,42
holding that the consequences to the convicted will be used to de-
termine if indictment is necessary. The adoption of such an "im-
pact text" demands a recognition of the relationship between the
necessity of indictment and the punishment possible upon a convic-
tion.43 It would appear that if assault is indictable generally, 44
and specifically where the punishment is as little as a twenty-five
dollar fine,45 then surety of the peace, with its potential for much
36. Commonwealth v. Taub, 187 Pa. Super. 440, 144 A.2d 628 (1958);
Commonwealth v. Cushard, 184 Pa. Super. 193, 132 A.2d 366 (1957); Com-
monwealth v. Franklin, 172 Pa. Super. 152, 92 A.2d 272 (1952).
37. 206 Va. 551, 138 S.E.2d 256 (1964).
38. Id. at 555, 138 S.E.2d at 260 (1969).
39. Id.
40. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
41. Id. at 160. The Court in Duncan also indicates that had the fed-
eral courts required jury trial and indictment for the federal peace bond
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3043, the state courts would be compelled to follow.
Id. at 149.
42. 389 Pa. 639, 133 A.2d 800 (1957).
43. Id. at 644, 645, 647.
44. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4708 (1963).
45. Commonwealth v. Moul, 79 Pa. D. & C. 316 (C.P. York 1951).
greater punishment, would necessitate an indictment. An example
of the abuse possible in surety of the peace punishments is exposed
by Ex parte Fenske.46 There a justice of the peace required a $3500
bond. The defendant failed to post the bond and served two years
in jail on the sole committing authority of the justice of the peace.
4 7
Thus, the surety of the peace action endangers basic liberties
where persons are incarcerated as a preventive measure rather
than for the commission of an actual offense, without trial by jury,
or the determination of a competent court.
The United States Supreme Court has set incarceration for six
months as the point at which punishment becomes severe and de-
serving of a jury trial in criminal cases. 48 In Duncan, the Court
looked to the potential maximum penalty rather than the sentence
imposed in the case on review. 49 Although the sixty day sentence
was much less than the two year maximum sentence, it was the po-
tential for the two years penalty that made the Court deem the ac-
tion worthy of the procedural safeguards of a serious crime.
50
Even if the nature of surety of the peace is not accepted as strictly
criminal, the criminal standard may be applied. The Supreme
Court indicated this in regard to contempt actions:
Criminally contemptuous conduct may violate other pro-
visions of criminal law; but even when this is not the
case convictions for criminal contempt are indistinguish-
able from ordinary convictions, for their impact on the
individual is the same.
51
In an effort to protect the accused from "corrupt and overzealous
prosecutors and against the complaint, biased or eccentric judge," 52
the Supreme Court has strongly emphasized the desirability of jury
trials in much the same way as the Pennsylvania Superior Court did
in Commonwealth v. Franklin.
Once surety of the peace is accepted as worthy of criminal pro-
cedure enforcement of a criminal burden of proof would be only
logical. In many jurisdictions the burden is merely a preponder-
ance of the evidence and not the criminal standard of beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. 53 The civil burden of proof was found by Judge
Brosky to be the practice in Pennsylvania.5 4 The offense of assault
46. 148 Kan. 161, 79 P.2d 829 (1938).
47. Id.
48. Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966).
49. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). The Court held that the
60 day sentence could not be imposed without a trial by jury.
50. Article, The Supreme Court 1967 Term, 82 HARv. L. REv. 63, 149
(1968).
51. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). The Court went on to
conclude that a trial by jury was necessary because of the impact upon the
defendant.
52. Id. at 156.
53. 12 AM. JuR. 2d, Breach of Peace, § 47 (1964).
54. Commonwealth v. Miller, 119 Pitts. LJ. 215, 221 (Pa. C.P. 1971).




requires the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a
reasonable doubt. 5 Since the showing of the equivalent of assault
is necessary to sustain the surety of the peace action,50 it would
seem that the same burden ought to be employed. The rationale
for the less difficult burden of proof is that the courts should aid
the one seeking to prevent crime.57 This reasoning should be
weighed against the general policy against incarceration without
an adjudication of guilt.
5 8
In addition to finding that the Pennsylvania surety of the peace
statute violated due process, Judge Brosky also held that the statute
is a violation of equal protection provisions59 of the United States
and Pennsylvania Constitutions.60  This proposition is founded on
the varying impact upon the defendant due solely to his financial
ability. Upon the decision of the justice of the peace to place the
accused under bond, the defendant is confronted with three differ-
ent punishments contingent upon the amount of capital he can or
cares to muster. If the accused has the means to post his own bond,
he will suffer only the loss of the use to the capital while under the
bond. For the less financially able, the punishment will take the
slightly more onerous form of the premium he must pay to the pro-
fessional bail-bondsman who will provide the bond. Finally, for
the indigent defendant who is unable to pay the premium, there is
incarceration for at least the period between the initial hearing
and the common pleas trial. Upon affirmation of the findings of
the justice of the peace, the period of incarceration will be set anew.
In attacking the disparate results due solely to economic con-
siderations, the court in Miller relied mainly on Griffin v. Illinois6"
where the United States Supreme Court declared that in criminal
appeals a court cannot discriminate economically anymore than it
can on the basis of race or religion. In Griffin, the defendants
could not afford the required printing costs to secure a required
ranscript for the review of their conviction. The Supreme Court
held that the likelihood of reversible error should be the determin-
ing factor in taking appeals, not the defendants ability to meet the
costs. The Court concluded that freedom should not have a price
tag.
62
55. Commonwealth v. Franklin, 160 Pa. Super. 484, 52 A.2d 230 (1947).
56. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 23 (1964).
57. Arnold v. State, 92 Ind. 187 (1883).
58. Williamson v. United States, 184 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1950).
59. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.; PA. CONST. art. 1, § 9.
60. 119 Pitts. L.J. 215, 222 (1971).
61. 351 U.S. 12 (1955).
62. Id. at 18, 19.
While the theory of Griffin is one basis to attack the failure of
equal protection under the statute, Judge Brosky could have found
additional support in two related areas. One argument is that the
peace bond should be administered in light of Supreme Court dic-
tated requirements for bail and bond generally. In Stack V.
Boyle,63 the court held that the bond may not exceed the minimum
amount necessary to achieve the desired purpose.6 4 The appear-
ance bond should require an amount sufficient to insure appear-
ance at trial and no more. In interpreting federal bail procedure,
the court noted that bail was used to prevent infliction of punish-
ment prior to a determination of guilt.63 The problem arises
whether the purposes of surety of the peace may be achieved
without an incarceration before a conviction. Is there a sum small
enough for the bond to be within the indigent defendant's means
but large enough to act as a deterrent and satisfy the purpose of
the actions? It may be contended that the defendant in the surety
action ought to be given the opportunity to make a reasonable bond
like other criminally accused persons not convicted. 6   The policy
against incarceration prior to criminal conviction was articulated
before Stack in the federal courts.67 The effect of the surety of
the peace action upon the indigent defendant appears incompatible
with the policy of these decisions.
Secondly, imprisonment in lieu of bond is analogous to im-
prisonment for inability to pay a fine. The Supreme Court held it
violative of due process to jail the defendant in Tate v. Short68 for
failure to pay fines due to financial inability. In explaining the de-
cision, the Court stated: "In each case, the constitution prohibits the
state from imposing a fine as a sentence and automatically convert-
ing it into a jail term solely because the defendant is indigent and
cannot forthwith pay the fine in full. '69 In the instance of the
peace bond, the inability to pay the bondsman's premium is auto-
matically converted into a prison term. This economic discrimi-
nation is more alarming in the surety of the peace situation since
the person jailed has not been charged, tried or convicted of any
crime. An alternative to immediate payment is the payment of
smaller sums on an installment plan in accordance with the Act of
1917.70
63. 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
64. Id. at 6.
65. Id. at 7.
66. 342 U.S. 8 (concurring opinion). Mr. Justice Frankfurter concur-
ring stated: "On the contrary, the spirit of bail is to enable them to stay
out of jail until a trial has found them guilty."
67. See note 58 supra.
68. 91 S. Ct. 668 (1971).
69. Id. at 671.
70. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 953 (1964); see also, ABA MIN. STAND. FOR




The entire thrust of the Brosky opinion in Miller and the sup-
porting decisions used to develop his basis for the finding of un-
constitutionality is a posteriori. Judge Brosky and the other courts
looked beyond what the law had been as to due process as dictated
by statute or common law to examine the impact of this procedure
on the accused. From this determination, the courts reason back
to what the due process safeguards ought to be to satisfy current
interpretations of constitutional requirements. The need to re-
examine due process and the evolutionary nature of due process
was expounded by Justice Frankfurter in Griffin: "Due Process is,
perhaps, the least frozen concept of law, the least confined to his-
tory and the most absorptive of powerful social standards of a pro-
gressive society."' Society may have evolved so that the surety
of the peace action will take a place beside stocks and pillories as a
method of criminal justice.
In reviewing the constitutionality of the surety of the peace
statute, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will be equipped with
the superior court decision in Commonwealth v. Franklin that one
should not be jailed for failure to post bond after acquittal under
the surety of the peace statute.72 In addition it will have the gen-
eral mandate issued by the United States Supreme Court in Dun-
can v. Louisiana that the courts have a responsibility to determine
at what point an offense reaches a level of seriousness which re-
quires all the procedural safeguards of a criminal proceeding.73 Fi-
nally, the prior adoption by the supreme court of an "impact test"
with reference to indictments in Commonwealth v. Cano74 paves
the way for a determination by the court that the surety of the
peace statute, as presently administered, violates due process. The
court will also have to consider the argument that the peace bond
system of preventive justice violates equal protection. The fact
that surety of the peace inflicts more severe punishment on the
poor than it does on the rich must be examined in light of the
standards for testing due process that have evolved in recent years.
It is submitted that the potential for unequal and at times unjust
punishment without benefits traditionally afforded an accused,
renders a decision by the Supreme Court affirming Commonwealth
v. Miller desirable.
PAUL LASKOW
71. Griffin v. Ilinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1955) (concurring opinion).
72. 172 Pa. Super. 152, 92 A.2d 272 (1952). See text accompanying
note 19, supra.
73. See text accompanying notes 40-41 supra.
74. See text accompanying notes 42-43 supra.

